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m O D U C T l o N  
The Idaho legislature enacted several statutes addressing the conduct of elections in 
Idaho; the challenge of elected officials after taking office for failure to qualify for office at the 
time of election; removal of officials after election when the office is held without authority of 
law; and the creation of vacancies in offices of public officials. With respect to municipal 
elections, Chapter 4, Title 50, addresses the conduct of elections. Chapter 20, Title 34 addresses 
a post-election challenge of an individual who was not qualified for office at the time of the 
election. Chapter 6,  Title 6 addresses the removal of a public officer who holds office without 
authority of law. Chapter 9, Title 59 addresses the events deemed to create vacancies in public 
offices. 
This case involved the removal of a mayor fiom his office by the district court aAer he 
took office due to a claim that the mayor became ineligible to remain in office as a result of a 
failure to remain a qualified elector during his term of office as required by LC. 5 50-601. In its 
reply brief, the City of Huetter ("City") takes exception to Keene characterizing this matter as a 
contest to Keene's right to hold office as mayor, firmly stating that this matter involves only a 
request by it for declaration of Keene's right to continue in the office of mayor following Keene's 
failure to respond to a challenge by another elector of his entry as an elector in the election 
record and poll book. 
However, the essence of the arguments presented by the City on appeal are that Keene 
was ineligible prior to taking office to take office because his voter registration was challenged at 
the election and his regishation was subsequently canceIIed in January 2008, thus making him 
unqualified to hold the office at the time of his election in November 2007, thus causing the 
provisions of LC. 5 50-469 to be applicable. Alternatively, the City argues that Keene became 
ineligible to continue in office pursuant to LC. $ 50-601 due to the cancellation of his voter 
registration for a short period of time after his election. 
Although Chapter 20, Title 34 addresses the method provided by the legislature to contest 
an incumbent for failure to qualify for the office at the time of election and Chapter 6, Title 6 
addresses the removal of an officer from his office when the officer continues to hold the office 
without authority of law (i.e. is ineligible to hold office), the City maintains that LC. § 50-469 
was intended to provide a mechanism for a City to oust an elected official from office when 
either (1) the elected official was not qualified at the time of election or (2) the elected official 
became ineligible to hold office after the election, even though qualified at the time of election. 
Although not relevant to the issues on appeal, another matter which merits response in 
this reply brief is the City's allegations of inappropriate conduct by Keene after the cancellation 
of his voter registration, apparently presented to cause this wurt to form an unfavorable opinion 
of Keene. The City sprinkled throughout its brief claims that the record showed that Keene 
engaged in verbal altercations with the city attorney and some council members, dismpted the 
orderly business of the City, and willfully chose not to retrieve certified documents from the post 
office sent to him by the elections department. The majority of these allegations were supported 
by cites to the City's petition allegations, and not evidence in the record from trial. 
The petition claimed that there was a verbal altercation lasting some thirty minutes at the 
February 13,2008 meeting when the City rehed  to allow Keene or Brown to take their seats at 
the council meeting. Tbis refusal was transmitted by the city attorney, who idormed Keene and 
Brown they could not hold office and could not be appointed to their position (although they had 
already been sworn in), despite the fact that at that time there was no court decree declaring their 
seats vacant. R p. 4. Following this disagreement regarding Keene's status, the City sought the 
opinion of the Idaho attorney general and was advised that the attorney general was of the 
opinion that a cancellation from the voter registration did not result in an automatic ouster of the 
mayor from office. R p. 15. Keene also provided a legal opinion expressing his position on the 
matter of automatic ouster pursuant to LC. § 50-469. R p. 16. 
More importantly, the actual evidence that was submitted to the trial court regarding this 
sequence of events was contained in Stipulated Fact #8. This stipulated fact recited that on 
February 13, 2008, the City refused to recognize or seat Keene or Brown based on the city 
attorney's assessment that they were ineligible to hold office and therefore their offices were 
vacant due to their removal from the voter registration rolls by Kootenai County. R p. 52. There 
was no evidence of any verbal altercation or disruption, only fundamental disagreement. 
The record also reflects that the Court denied the City's request for a preliminary 
injunction preventing Keene from acting as mayor. Even though the City was unsuccessful in 
obtaining a p r e l i  injunction to prohibit Keene's participation in city govenunent, Keene 
subsequently proposed a reciprocal stipulated Order of Preliminary Injunction l i t i n g  the 
actions which would be taken by himself and the City so as to protect the interests of the citizens 
of the City of Huetter. R p. 34. 
The City's implication in its brief that Keene acted in a disruptive, abusive manner in this 
matter is simply not true. He merely acted as an individual who wished to protect his rights as an 
elected official. In fact, it was the action of the city attorney that caused much of the 
disturbance. Had the city attorney sought the opinion of the attorney general and filed an action 
at the outset rather than attempting to block elected officials from their office without guidance 
or court decree, much of the drama wuld have been avoided. 
As to the issue of the certified mail receipt, the City challenged Keene's statement on 
appeal that Keene was unable to obtain the certified mailing due to his work schedule. The City 
claims Keene was not correct in representing on appeal that the record reflected he was working 
a 60 hour work week. The testimony given during examination of Mr. Keene was: 
Q. I just put forth the question and restate: Mr. Keene, why didn't you pick up the 
envelope that was addressed to you? 
A. At the time I was working about 60 hours a week. And I really didn't have time 
to go into Coeur d' Alene as I was working in Post Falls. So any time that I would 
have had to pick that letter up the post office wouldn't have been opened. 
Q: And so you were working at all times when the post office was open during that 
time period. 
A. I was working form 8:00 in the morning until 7:00 or 8:00 at night, Monday 
through Saturday. Sunday, 1O:OO to 4:OO. 
Finally, the City claims, without any cite to the record that the Coeur d'Alene, Idaho post office 
was open during the hours Keene had OK The only evidence in the record on this matter is 
Keene's testimony that the post office was not open during the hours he had OK Keene did not 
avoid receipt of the certified mailing fiom the county clerk. Had the letter been sent regular mail 
as anticipated by the statute, Keene would have received it in a timely manner. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court did not Properly Construe I.C. 850-469 
The trial court held that LC. 4 50-469 provided a third statutory mechanism for 
addressing the ineligibility of a person to hold office, but that the statute was ambiguous as to 
operation of this third mechanism because the trial court was not left with a clear and simple 
understanding of how LC. 4 50469 should be applied within the body of Idaho election law. R 
p. 70. On appeal, Keene challenges the trial court's construction of LC. 4 50-469, claiming that it 
was not intended by the legislature to provide a third mechanism for challenging the right of a 
person to hold office or to effect an ouster of an elected municipal official. 
In its reply, the City notes that this Court on appeal may not find LC. 8 50-469 
ambiguous as did the district court below. Apparently recognizing Keene's argument that the 
Statement of Purpose respecting Chapter 4, Title 50 demonstrates this chapter was enacted to 
address the conduct of elections and place the processes in sequential order, the City notes that 
this Court might find on appeal that LC. 5 50-469 was intended to only address electoral 
challenges arising at the time of election. The City concludes, "Since challenges made pursuant 
to Idaho Code 8 50-427 could not be resolved until after the election, a person could be elected 
and still fail to qualify for the office in the future due to such a challenge." (Respondent's brief, 
page 8.) The city concludes it was therefore proper for the district court to declare a vacancy in 
such circumstances pursuant to LC. § 50-469. Although not expressly argued, the City 
apparently presumes that the cancellation of registration is retroactive and therefore constitutes a 
failure to qualify at the time of election because the candidate would not be a registered voter if 
there is retroactive application to the date of the election. 
Nothing in the statutes or the legislative history supports this argument. Idaho Code 
8 50-427 allows any registered elector at the time of the election to challenge the entry of another 
elector's name as it appears in the election record and poll book. It does not address the contest 
of a candidate's qualifications at the time of election or a challenge to an incumbent's eligibility 
to remain in office. Once challenged pursuant to LC. § 50-427, the county clerk has the 
obligation to inform the challenged elector by mail of the nature of the challenge and how to 
respond to the challenge. I.C. § 34-432. If there is no response, or an unsatisfactory response, 
the challenged voter's registration may be cancelled. However, nothing in LC. $ 34-432 allows 
the clerk to declare an incumbent ineligible for office or remove him fiom office as a result of a 
voter challenge. In fact, the removal %om the voter registration does not even invalidate the vote 
cast by the challenged voter. 
Further, the City's analysis of its argument is incomplete. While acknowledging that a 
person would be ineligible at the time of election under this argument, the City does not 
complete its anaIysis of how such a fact intertwines within the applicable election statutes or the 
legislature's intent in enacting Chapter 4, Title 50. 
The City acknowledges that, "Idaho Code $ 50-469 does not specify who or what entity 
must declare a vacancy exists if a person elected fails to qualify for an office, but does state the 
mayor and the council shall fill the vacancy." (Respondent's brief, page 5.) It is accurate that 
LC. $ 50-469 does not provide a mechanism for a challenge based upon ineligibility to hold 
office at the time of election. Rather, Title 34, Chapter 20 addresses the mechanism for 
determining a vacancy based on a challenge for failure to qualify for office at the time of election 
and the mechanism for removal in such event. Specifically, LC. $ 34-2001(2) provides in 
relevant part that the election of any person to any public office may be contested when the 
incumbent was not eligible to the office at the time of the election. Such challenge must come 
fiom another elector of the City. LC. $ 34-2007. Should such a challenge be successful, the 
district court then declares the office vacant pursuant to Chapter 9, Title 59. LC. 8 34-2021. 
Nothing in the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature allows a city to request the district 
court to declare a vacancy for a failure to qualify for office at the time of election. 
The City maintains that it did not request the district court to declare a vacancy based 
upon ineligibility at the time of the election, thus avoiding the above analysis. Rather, the City 
contends its request was to declare a vacancy (ouster) due to Keene's failure to remain a qualified 
elector during his term of office. The City correctly notes that Idaho Code § 50-601 specifies 
that, "[alny person shall be eligible to hold the office of mayor who is a qualified elector of the 
city at the time his declaration of candidacy or declaration of intent is submitted to the city clerk 
and remains a qualified elector during his term of office." 
It is undisputed in this matter that Keene was a qualified elector at the time his 
declaration of candidacy was submitted to the city clerk as required by LC. § 50-601. However, 
the city maintains that because Keene's voter registration was cancelled after he took office, he 
became ineligible to hold office and it was proper for the trial court to find LC. 5 50-469 
provided statutory authority for the trial court to oust Keene from office and declare the mayor's 
office vacant under such circumstances. 
Idaho Code section 59-901 addresses events occurring during the term of office that 
create a vacancy in a public official's office. Lneligibiiity to hold the office is not one of the 
events that the legislature has designated as creating a vacancy. Thus, the statutory authority to 
declare a vacancy must arise from another statutory provision. The City claims that provision is 
LC. 8 50-469. 
Assuming arguendo that Keene did become ineligible to hold office due to the 
cancellation of his voter registration, nothing contained within LC. 5 50-469 indicates that it was 
intended to provide a mechanism to address such post-election ineligibility and oust a mayor 
from office. The City contends that the legislature intended a forward-looking interpretation of 
Idaho Code 5 50-469 as demonstrated from language found in LC. 5 50-427 and LC. 5 50-601. 
The City does not expound on this argument. 
By its express terms, I.C. 5 50-469 applies to the circumstance where the person has been 
elected but fails to qualify at the time of election. It does not address ineligibility arising after 
the election. No language in either LC. Ij 50-427 (challenge of a voter's name in the election 
record and poll book) or LC. 8 50-469 (failure to qualify for office at time of election) expresses 
any intent that I.C. Ij 50-469 is intended to provide a post-election mechanism to remove an 
incumbent from his office. 
With respect to LC. Ij 50-601, the City's argument is that Keene could not hold the office 
of mayor because he became ineligible after election pursuant to the statute. Thus, the City is 
arguing Keene is holding office without authority of law. While I. C. Ij 50-601 addresses the 
eligibility requirements to hold the position of a mayor, nothing in this statute contains any 
reference to LC. Ij 50-469 as a mechanism for the ouster of a mayor should ineligibility occur 
after taking office, nor does this statute address removal of the mayor from office. 
Ineligibility arising after the election is irrelevant to the conduct of the election. Thus, 
I.C. 5 50-469 sheds no light on how ineligibility to hold office arising afkr the election should be 
addressed. The only statute that addresses removal of an officer from office when the office is 
held without authority of law is LC. Ij 6-602, which allows for ouster when the office is held 
without authority of law. Thus, LC. Ij 50-469 does not provide a mechanism to oust an 
incumbent from office. Rather, the statutory mechanism provided by the legislature is the 
mechanism contained in Chapter 6, Title 6. 
In conclusio~ the legislative history, Statement of Purpose, and the order of the statutes 
contained in Chapter 4, Title 50 establish they were intended to address the conduct of an 
election and limited to that purpose. The specific language of the LC. Ij 50-469 addresses an 
elected persons failure to qualify for the office at the time of the election. It does not address the 
I 
circumstance when an incumbent later becomes ineligible after taking office to hold the office 
I 
and certainly provides no mechanism for ouster of an officer when ineligibility occurs after the 
conduct of the election. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that LC. 8 50-469 was intended to 
provide a mechanism for ouster from office of an incumbent who becomes ineligible post- 
election to hold office pursuant to LC. § 50-601. 
B. The Present Case as Postured by the City on Appeal Involves a Contest to 
Keene's Eligibility to Hold Office at the T i e  of Election 
The trial court acknowledged that Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621,95 P.26 (1908) held 
that Idaho statute provided two remedies for reaching the ineligibility of a person to hold office, 
one being contesting the election of the person to hold office under Sec. 119 of the Act of 
February 2, 1899 and the other being by way of a quo warranto proceeding under Secs. 4612 to 
4169, Rev. Statutes. (These two methods have been recodified at Chapter 20, Title 34 and 
Chapter 6, Title 6, respectively.) The trial court held that even though that proposition may have 
been true in 1908 when Toncray was decided, since the enactment of LC. r) 50-469 in 1978, at 
least a third method for reaching the ineligibility of a person to hold office. R p. 70. The trial 
court also held that the present action was not a contest to the actuaI election of Keene because 
the claim of the City was that Keene became an "unqualified elector" after Keene began his tern 
of office, and therefore LC. 5 34-2007 was not applicable to the instant case. R p. 70. 
In its response on appeal, the City claims that in Idaho, a person may be elected to public 
officer prior to his qualification for that office being verified. (Respondent's brief, page 5.) The 
City also argues that to become eligible to hold office, an officer must meet dual requirements of 
being elected and qualified before they become an incumbent. (Respondent's brief, page 13.) 
The City also claims that, "[iln the instant case, although Keene was elected, he never qualified 
to hold his office ..." (Respondent's brief, page 14.) Thus, the City's position in its brief on 
appeal is that although Keene was elected, he was not qualified to hold his office, and was 
therefore ineligible to hold the office at the time of his election. 
Idaho Code 5 34-2001 addresses an election contest for a failure to qualify at the time of 
the election. The City's argument that a person's failure to qualify for office creates an automatic 
vacancy vitiates Title 34, Chapter 20, as well as LC. 5 59-901. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Determining the Cancellation of Keene's Voter 
Registration Rendered him Ineligible to Continue in Office 
In its brief on appeal, the City claims that the trial court did not e n  in determining that 
Keene was ineligible to hold office because he was an "unqualified elector". The City's position 
is that Keene was required to be a registered voter to be a qualified elector, and cancellation of 
his registration for the period of January 18,2008 through February 25,2008 "unqualified him to 
hold office." In making this argument, the City never addresses Keene's argument that Keene 
was registered to vote in the November 6,2007 election, and was thus a qualified elector for that 
election as the cancellation was not retroactive. Similarly, the City simply ignores Keene's 
argument on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that a mayor must be continuously 
registered during his term to be a qualified elector because a lapse in registration is only relevant 
if it prevents the mayor from registering for an actual pending election. 
Between the time Keene's registration was cancelled and he re-registered, there was no 
pending election. Idaho Code section 34-404 requires a person to register to be able to vote. 
Registration is allowed up to twenty-four (24) days preceding any pending election. I.C. 5 34- 
408. 
To be a quatied city elector, a person must be: 1) at least 18 years of age; 2) a U.S. 
citizen and 3) a resident of the city for at least 30 days before the election, or a resident of an area 
that the city has annexed within 30 days of the election and 4) registered within the time 
period as allowed by law. I.C. 5 50-402(c). It is undisputed that Keene was registered for the 
November 6, 2007 election, thus he was a qualified elector at that time. It is further undisputed 
that during the interim between the cancellation of his registration and his re-registration that 
there were no pending elections &om which he was precluded from voting due to the 
cancellation of his registration. Keene's re-registration qualified him to vote in all upcoming city 
elections. Thus, the cancellation of Keene's registration did not result in Keene's inability to 
qualify as an elector. Therefore, he did not fail to remain a qualified elector as defined by the 
relevant statutes and constitutional provisions. 
D. The City is not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
The City seeks attorney fees on appeal pmuant to LC. 5 12-1 17. Idaho Code section 12- 
1 17 provides: 
in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a .  . 
. city . . . and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
The City argues that on appeal Keene has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The issue of whether LC. 4 50-469 provides a third mechanism for the removal of an elected 
official from his public office is an issue of first impression in Idaho. This factor has been 
weighed by this Court on appeals in determining whether an appeal is pursued without 
reasonable basis in fact or law. See Smith v. Idaho Department of Labor, I'iaho- - 
P.3d - (2009 Opinion No. 11 7, Docket No. 35651). 
Further, LC. 8 50-469 is contained in that portion of Title 50 which addresses the conduct 
of elections. It provides no express provisions that it was intended to be used to contest an 
election of a public official or oust him from office. The Statement of Purpose and legislative 
history for this statute provides no support for the proposition that this statute was intended by 
the legislature to be used as a mechanism to remove elected officials fiom their public office and 
declare vacancies in their office. Thus, it can not be said that Keene has acted without a 
reasonable basis in law or fact in pursuing this appeal. 
The City also claims this appeal was brought frivolously pursuant to LC. 8 12-121. 
Under that statute, attorney fees will be awarded to a prevailing respondent when this Court is 
left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation. Nelson/Pehrson v. Big Lost River Irrigation District, - Idaho -, - 
P.3d - (2009 Opinion No. 116, Docket No. 35543-2008), citing to Downey v. Vavold, 144 
Idaho 592,596, 166 P.3d 382,386 (2007). This Court has weighed whether a matter is a case of 
first impression in determining whether an appeal was pursued .frivolously. Nelson/Pehrson, 
supra. For the same reasons advanced in the previous argument on why this case was pursued 
without basis in fact or law, it can not be said that this case was pursued frivolously. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
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